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INTRODUCTION
The trial court expressed confusion in its application of the trial facts to the law under
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. See Memorandum Decision dated April 7,2004
(copy attached as Addendum "A," and referred to hereafter as the "Memorandum Decision")
("The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is confusing."
Memorandum Decision at 2). In fact, the trial court noted the competing interests between
settling boundary disputes by recorded instruments on the one hand, and allowing the peace
and good order of society to be served by judicially recognizing boundaries accepted over
a long period of time, on the other; as if these competing interests were still in question in
the State of Utah. See Memorandum Decision at 2-3. Utah courts have balanced these
competing interests, and determined that the latter interests outweigh the former; it is no
longer subject to debate. It is respectfully suggested that the trial court misunderstood the
applicable law with respect to the element of mutual acquiescence under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence, and made erroneous inferences which are inconsistent with the
facts.
ARGUMENT
I.

Elements of Boundary by Acquiescence.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court found that three of the four elements of
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence had been met. Specifically, the court found:
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A.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or

buildings.
Near the North border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence which runs along what
is now the disputed boundary in a southeasterly direction, roughly along the
Southern border of the Brown parcel.
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 2.
The fence has been observable since its construction.. .[and] the court, based
on several other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained observable
and open since the mid 1940s.
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3.
Below that fence plaintiff and his family have used the property to graze cattle
and sheep. There is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and
improved which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has also
caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing culverts.
Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6.
Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He inspected the
property and observed fence posts but the court finds the fence was visible.
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 8.
Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that area of the ditch
[below the fence] but the court finds that was not occupation of the land.
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 10.
B.

For a long period of time.

This element was established by partial summary judgment by Judge Robert K. Hilder
on April 6, 2002. See Memorandum Decision at 1-2.
The trial court also specifically found that this element was met:
The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas Brown, T. Edward
Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946 [and] the fence has
remained in the same basic position since that time . . . .
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3.
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In 1979 Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel
Memorandum Decision at 4-5, Finding of Fact No. 4; Jorgensen obtained
legal title to an interest in the Jorgensen parcel on April 1, 1979, see Exhibit
18, the relevant portion of which is attached hereto as Addendum "B".
On or about July 1,1999, defendant wrote a note to plaintiffs telling them that
they had built a fence on defendant's land and it should be removed.
Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 7.
C.

By adjoining landowners

This element was also established by partial summary judgment issued by Judge
Robert K. Hilder on April 6,2002. See Memorandum Decision at 1-2. Additionally, the trial
court found that "Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in Summit County."
Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 1.
D.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

As more particularly discussed below, the trial court made factual findings on this
issue that support a conclusion that the element is established, such as the Plaintiffs
maintained and improved the property on their side of the fence and both parties and their
predecessors had always occupied up to but not beyond the fence without objection. See
Memorandum Decision at 5-6, Finding of Fact Nos. 5, 6, and 7. However the trial court
inferred as a matter of law that mutual acquiescence had not occurred. See Memorandum
Decision at 8-9, Conclusion of Law Nos. 5, 6 and 7. It is the trial court's legal conclusions
regarding mutual acquiescence that Appellants will address in this Reply Memorandum.
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II.

Marshaling of the Evidence.

In his brief, Appellee correctly notes that to challenge a trial court's findings of fact,
an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, and
then identify a fatal flaw in the evidence sufficient to convince the appellate court that the
trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See A WINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d
1228,1230 (Utah App. 2005). In the absence of such marshaling of evidence, the appellate
court is to assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law
in the particular case. See id. Appellants maintain that the evidentiary findings of the trial
court do not support it's legal conclusions regarding the element of mutual acquiescence.
Aside from the trial court's rather loose usage of the term "survey" in its findings of
fact, the Appellants do not object to the court's findings of fact as listed in its Memorandum
Decision. Appellants do note, however, that the 1971 "survey" referenced in the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 5 (Memorandum Decision at 5) was not technically a survey, but was
rather a plot drawing to enable the Plaintiffs to construct a home on their property. See T.
at 111-12 and Exhibit 6. Additionally, the 1994 "survey" commissioned by Defendant as
referenced in the trial court's Finding of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 (Memorandum Decision at 6-7),
was also not technically a survey, but rather was a diagram drawn by Wally France. See T.
at 102-03. The 1994 drawing by Wally France showed the boundary line running through
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Plaintiffs' residential home, which the trial court acknowledged was incorrect.

See

Memorandum Decision at 6-7, Finding of Fact Nos. 7 and 11.
In fact, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant commissioned an actual land survey of their
boundary line until after the dispute arose in July of 1999. See Exhibits 7, 9 and 10.
Therefore, prior to 1999, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant knew with certainty the
exact location of the boundary line between their respective parcels. Significantly, no survey,
plot plan, diagram or land inspection by surveyors was conducted prior to 1999 for the
purpose of determining whether the subject fence was the common boundary between the
parties. The definitive surveys, conducted after July 1999, show that the record boundary
line lies below the fence; however no objective certainty was reached as to the actual
boundary line until after the dispute arose in 1999. See Exhibits 7, 9 and 10.

III.

Mutual Acquiescence Was Established at Trial.

A.

Standard of Review

The issue of whether the trial court correctly concluded that the parties did not
acquiesce in the fence as a boundary, is reviewable as a matter of law. Wilkenson Family
Farm LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999).
B.

Elements of Mutual Acquiescence

The elements of mutual acquiescence have been articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court using varying terminology. At times, the standard is expressed as a showing that "both
parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, as the
5

boundary of the adjacent parcels." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781,788 (Utah 2002) (emphasis
added). More recently, inRHNCorp. v. Veibell, 96P.3d935,1f31 (Utah 2004) the Supreme
Court favorably cited a case using a slightly different standard: "[W]here owners of adjacent
parcels of land have occupied, adversely to each other for more than [the required period of
time], their respective tracks by a division line, which each has recognized and acquiesced
in as the true boundary line, during all of that time, either is estopped from afterwards
questioning it as the true line." Id., quoting Rydalch v. Anderson, 107 P. 25, 30 (1910)
(emphasis added).
The distinction is important because of the varying meanings of the words employed.
The word "acknowledge" is defined as: "To own, avow, or admit; to confess; to recognize
one's acts, and assume the responsibility therefor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (5th ed.
1979). In other words, the term "acknowledge" denotes some overt act or express agreement
on the part of the property owner to admit or confess that the fence is the boundary line.
By contrast, the term "acquiesce" is defined as: "To give an implied consent to a
transaction, to the accrual of a right, or to any act, by one's mere silence, or without express
assent or acknowledgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast to
an acknowledgment, an acquiescence is by definition without acknowledgment, and may be
done by silence. After all, the legal doctrine is known as "Boundary by Acquiescence," not
"Boundary by Acknowledgment" or "Boundary by Agreement." This is a significant
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principle that Plaintiff argued at trial and that was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in RHN
Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935, p i (Utah 2004).
The trial court required that the Plaintiffs show that both parties recognized and
acknowledged the fence as the boundary line. "To show mutual acquiescence, plaintiffs must
show both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties
acknowledge the line as a demarcation between the properties." Memorandum Decision at
3.

In the court's application of the law to the facts of this case, it uses the term

"acknowledge" repeatedly throughout its Conclusions of Law. See, e.g., Memorandum
Decision at 9-10, Conclusion of Law No. 6, where the trial court uses the term
"acknowledge," or a variant thereof, nine separate times.
It appears that, in some instances, the courts have used the terms "acquiescence" and
"acknowledgment" interchangeably. For example, the two principal cases cited in Ault v.
Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002) as support for the "recognized and acknowledged"
standard expressly state the standard as requiring the parties to "recognize and acquiesce in"
the boundary line. Florence v. Hiline Equip. Co., 581 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1978) ("It is
well established that if adjoining landowners occupy their respective premises up to a certain
line which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a long period of time, the true
boundary being unknown, they are precluded from claiming that the boundary line thus
recognized and acquiesced in is not the true one." (Emphasis added). Fuoco v. Williams,
All P.2d 944, 947 (1966) ("In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence, it is not
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necessary that the acquiescence should be manifested by a conventional agreement, but
recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the
existence of a line as boundary line." (Emphasis added).
Further, the Ault court added a quote from American Jurisprudence in support of the
"recognized and acknowledged" standard as follows: "When adjoining landowners occupy
their respective premises up to a certain line which they mutually recognize and acquiesce
in for a long period of time,... they are precluded from claiming that the boundary line thus
recognized and acquiesced in is not the true one." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah
2002) quoting 12 AM. JUR. 2D Boundaries § 83 (1997) (emphasis in original).
C.

Origin of "Acknowledgment" Element

The notion of requiring an overt acknowledgment of a fence as a boundary line in
cases involving the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence appears to have its genesis in
Wilkenson Family Farm LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App 1999). "Mutual
acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that both parties recognize the
specific line, and that both parties acknowledge the line as the demarcation between the
properties." Id. at 231 (emphasis added). In support of this proposition, the Wilkenson court
cites Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966), which is cited above, and which stated
the standard as "recognize and acquiesce in" the line. The Wilkenson court goes on to state:
"Acquiescence does not require an explicit agreement, 'but recognition and acquiescence
must be mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the]
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boundary line.'" Wilkenson at 231, quoting Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224,1227 (Utah
1974) (emphasis added). Even the Wilkenson court appears to use the terms "acquiescence"
and "acknowledgment" interchangeably.
The Wilkenson case contained facts that justified a more stringent acknowledgment
standard for mutual acquiescence. In that case, Babcock5 s predecessors built a fence on their
property to keep their cattle from wandering onto Wilkenson's property. The fence could not
be located entirely on the boundary line (which was a section line) because of cliffs and
gullies, so a portion of it was built on a slant. Both parties knew that the exclusive purpose
of this "slant fence" was to keep cattle from wandering onto Wilkenson's property.
Apparently, Wilkenson did not dispute the clear purpose of the fence, but rather argued that
the purpose of the fence should not be considered by the court because the other elements of
the boundary by acquiescence doctrine had been met. See Wilkenson at 230-31.
The court declined to award Wilkenson the disputed property under the facts
presented, and rather imposed a requirement that Wilkenson prove that Babcock had
acknowledged the fence as a boundary line, as opposed to a cattle containment device. "In
Holmes, the court carefully noted that owners could claim to the true property lines beyond
the fence 'where it is clear that the [fence] as located was not intended as a boundary."' Id.
at 231, quoting Holmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (1906).
In a later case, defendants in a boundary by acquiescence case attempted to argue that
the court's holding in Wilkenson amounted to the elimination of indolence or silence as a
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basis for establishing acquiescence. The defendants argued that because they had not
expressly acknowledged the fence as a boundary line, mutual acquiescence could not be
established under Wilkenson. See Mason v. Loveless, 24 P.3d 997, 1004 (Utah App 2001).
The Mason court strongly rejected this notion stating: "Furthermore, our supreme court has
acknowledged that '[acquiescence is more nearly synonymous with indolence, or consent
by silence.' Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). Thus, our settled case law is
contrary to defendants' argument and clearly provides that acquiescence maybe established
by silence.55 Id. Appellants respectfully submit that if an outright acknowledgment of a fence
as a boundary line is always a required element of mutual acquiescence in the State of Utah,
then boundary by acquiescence could never by established by silence.
Finally, as recently as this year, this court has favorably cited the standard for mutual
acquiescence to be that both parties recognize and acquiesce in the fence as a boundary line.
"The trial court concluded, based on the undisputed facts presented by the parties, that' [t]he
boundaries between the Griffiths Property [and] the Buttars[es] Property . . . have been
clearly marked and identified, as they are now, by long established fence lines, which fence
lines have been recognized and acquieseed in by the respective owners of the Griffiths
Property [and] the Buttarsfes] Property... as the actual boundaries between their respective
properties . . . ."' Massey v. Griffiths, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, % 11 n.2 (Utah App. 2005)
(emphasis added).
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D.

Reconciliation of Standard

The logical reconciliation of these varying cases is that the standard for mutual
acquiescence in Utah is that both parties must recognize and acquiesce in a fence as the
boundary line, unless there is some clear evidence of an alternate purpose for the fence, as
in Wilkenson. If there is clear evidence of a contrary purpose (other than as a boundary), then
a plaintiff must show that the defendant actually acknowledged the fence as a boundary line.
The "recognize and acquiesce" elements of mutual acquiescence are different than the
standard applied by the trial court in this case. The trial court used a standard of "recognize
and acknowledge," which is a higher burden than is required by Utah case law in a case of
this nature.
When the correct standard is applied to the case at bar, the outcome is quite different.
The trial court specifically found that the fence was built in the 1940s by the Plaintiff,
Thomas Brown, and his father (see Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact No. 3), and
that the fence has remained in the same basic position since that time (id.) and that the fence
has been observable since its construction. Id. Although Defendant Lee Jorgensen testified
at trial contrary to this visibility, the trial court "based on several other witnesses testimony,
finds the fence has remained observable and open since the mid-1940s. Several neighbors
and friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had been in the area and recall
the fence from the 1940s." Id. Based upon these findings, both parties clearly recognized the
fence since its construction in the mid-1940s.
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On the question of acquiescence, the court's factual findings also establish that the
Defendant Lee Jorgensen acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line. Specifically, the court
found that the Plaintiffs predecessor, T. Edward Brown, used his land to graze cattle and to
grow hay and other crops after construction of the fence until his death in 1951. See
Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Plaintiffs took possession of the Brown
parcel in 1971 and continued to use that parcel, including the disputed property below the
fence line, to graze cattle and sheep, and improve and maintain an irrigation ditch and
constructing culverts on the ditch. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact Nos. 5
and 6. The trial court also specifically found that neither Jorgensen nor his predecessors
attempted to use or occupy the subject property below, or on the Brown side of, the fence.
See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6. The court found that after taking
title to the Jorgensen parcel in 1979, that Jorgensen did nothing, by word or deed, to object
to the visible fence until July 1, 1999, more than 20 years after Jorgensen took title to his
property. See Memorandum Decision at 4 and 6, Finding of Fact Nos. 4 and 7. Based upon
the clear findings of fact rendered by the court, the inescapable conclusion is that Jorgensen
recognized and acquiesced in the fence as the boundary line, and title to the subject property
should be vested in Plaintiffs.
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E.

Case Distinguished from Wilkenson

To justify its conclusions, the trial court attempts to apply the analysis of Wilkenson
to this case. However the facts of this case as found by the trial court are very different from
the facts of the Wilkenson case:
1.

Construction of Fence. In Wilkenson, the defendant' s predecessor constructed

the slant fence in a location other than the record boundary line in order to contain his cattle
and prevent them from straying onto plaintiffs property. See Wilkenson at 230. By contrast,
in this case, Plaintiff Thomas Brown and his father constructed the fence in a location they
believed was the boundary line between their property and Jorgensen's predecessor's
property. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. In contrast to Wilkenson,
rather than building on their own property, the Browns had to trespass (as to record title) to
build the fence on ground belonging to Jorgensen's predecessor.
2.

Location of Fence. In Wilkenson, the fence was built on a slant from the

boundary line because to build the fence on the boundary line was impractical due to cliffs
and gullies. See Wilkenson at 230. By contrast, the Browns built their fence on the side of
a hill in an area that is steeper than the relatively flat ground where the record property line
is located. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 6; see also Exhibits 1 and
2. In other words, rather than building the Brown fence in a more convenient location as one
would expect for a cattle containment fence, the Browns instead built their fence on a side
hill where they thought the actual property line was located.
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3.

Known Purpose of Fence. In Wilkenson, both the plaintiff and the defendants

acknowledged that the original purpose of the fence was cattle containment. See Wilkenson
at 230. By contrast, in the present case, the court specifically found that the Browns always
considered the fence to be the property line ever since the fence was built. See Memorandum
Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Therefore, while the trial court inferred that the
purpose of the fence was for livestock containment, the sole testimony at trial, and the sole
finding of the trial court on this issue, was that the Plaintiffs intended the fence to be a
boundary when they constructed it in the 1940s. In short, the trial court's inference in this
case that the fence's purpose was for livestock containment is directly contradicted by the
trial court's factual findings.
4.

Reputation of Fence. In Wilkenson, the fence in question did not have a

reputation in the community as being the boundary line between the parties' respective
parcels. See Wilkenson at 230. In contrast, in this case, several neighbors testified that they
understood the fence to be the boundary line between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen
Parcel. This is alluded to by the trial court. See Memorandum Decision at 4, Finding of Fact
No. 3. Specifically, Lloyd Marchant testified that the community recognized the fence as the
boundary line between the two parcels. See T. at 42. Mr. Marchant further testified that he
recognized the fence as the boundary line between the two parcels. See T. at 51. Reinhard
Ruf testified that it was his understanding that the fence was the boundary line between the
Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. See T. at 54. Elden Stembridge also testified that
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he considered the boundary of the property to be along the fence line. See T. at 86. In light
of this evidence, the trial court's inference that the purpose of the fence was to contain
livestock is clearly erroneous.

IV.

Trial Court's Conclusions of Law.

To support its conclusion as a matter of law that there was no mutual acquiescence
in this case, the trial court made four (4) questionable conclusions which are not supported
by logic, reason, or the facts as found by the trial court.
A.

Purpose of Fence to Contain Livestock

The trial court inferred that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock.
The topography and terrain made the fence placement a practical place to erect
a fence as it would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land, until the home
was built in 1971. Given the slope and the irrigation ditch and the terrain in
the area the court infers and concludes that the purpose of the fence was to
contain livestock and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line demarcating
the property.
(Memorandum Decision at 8, Conclusions of Law No. 5).
As noted above, this conclusion of law is directly contradicted by the trial court's
factual finding that the builders of the fence, the Browns, considered the fence to be the
boundary. See Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. It is illogical to infer that
the Browns would build a fence on their neighbor's parcel that would keep their neighbor's
livestock from a water source that was also on their neighbor's parcel by record. Further, if
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the purpose of the fence was to protect the irrigation ditch from livestock on the Jorgensen
Parcel, why does the fence not run along the irrigation ditch instead of actually being located
quite a distance from the ditch? See Exhibits 7 and 10. Why does the fence run along a
hillside instead of the more level record property line? See Exhibits 1 and 2. The trial
court's inference that the purpose of the fence was a livestock containment fence is based
solely upon evidence that, from time to time during the nearly 60 year history since the
construction of the fence, livestock were kept on one side or the other of the fence.
However, in considering that fact, one must also consider the clear finding of the trial court
that "[t]he fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line and plaintiff
believed folly that the fence was the property line to his property and has believed that since
the fence was built. . .." Memorandum Decision at 5, Finding of Fact No. 5. Clearly, the
trial court's inference as to the purpose of the fence as merely for livestock containment is
not supported by the evidence nor by logic and reason.
B.

1994 Diagram

The trial court also concluded as a matt er of law that Jorgensen's investigation in 1994
of his property for development purposes manifested a lack of acquiescence of the fence as
the property boundary line. See Memorandum Decision at 9, Conclusion of Law No. 6.
The trial court erroneously concluded that the only reason to commission a survey
(such as it was), was to resolve a boundary line dispute. This was certainly not the case.
Surveys are routinely done in connection with real estate sale transactions and lending
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transactions. Obviously, in those instances, the surveys are not commissioned because a
property owner disputes one of its boundary lines.
In this case, the 1994 diagram was not made to determine whether the fence was the
true boundary, but rather to promote the sale of some of Jorgensen's land. The trial court
specifically found that Jorgensen's 1994 diagram was done "in anticipation of possible
buyers of some of his land." See Memorandum Decision at 6, Finding of Fact No. 11.
Therefore, by the trial court's own factual finding, Jorgensen did not order the 1994 diagram
in order to determine whether the fence was on the true boundary line; rather, Jorgensen
ordered the 1994 diagram in connection with a plan to market his property. That act alone
does not constitute non-acquiescence on the part of Jorgensen as to the fenceline boundary.
Moreover, the 1994 diagram was irrelevant to the true boundary, because the fence had been
established by operation of law as the monument of the boundary more than twenty years
earlier because of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence during Mr. Tracy's occupation.
SeeRHNM] 31.
C.

Non-Communication to Adjacent Property Owner

Next, the trial court concluded that a manifestation of non-acquiescence need not be
communicated to the adjacent property owner in order to defeat a boundary by acquiescence
claim. "Moreover, the court concludes [the 1994 diagram] need not have been conveyed to
the opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or unwillingness to accept the
fence as a boundary line." Memorandum Decision at 9, Conclusion of Law No. 6. This
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position is in direct conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's holding that while an ouster or
legal action is not required to prove non-acquiescence, "conversations in which a record
owner unequivocally informs the other that he owns beyond the 'visible line' claimed as a
boundary, and that the owner does not recognize that line as separating the properties, are
conclusive that a party has not acquiesced in the line as the property line." See Ault v.
Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 789 (Utah 2002). The trial court's contrary ruling fails to recognize
the estoppel-related underpinnings of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine. Indeed the
settled law in Utah clearly provides that "[acquiescence may also be shown by silence, or
the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." See RHN at % 25.
D.

Jorgensen's Predecessor's Acquiescence

Finally, the trial court failed to properly conclude that Jorgensen's predecessor, Tracy,
acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line. Instead, the trial court concluded: "There may
be an inference that Tracy, running livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ('recognized') the fence, let alone acknowledged it as
a boundary line." Memorandum Decision at 10, Conclusion of Law No. 6. In other words,
the trial court again improperly applied the "recognized and acknowledged" standard to
Jorgensen's predecessor, Tracy.
Unlike Jorgensen, who was essentially an absentee landowner, Tracy actually ran
livestock on the Jorgensen parcel after the fence was built. See Memorandum Decision at
6, Finding of Fact No. 9. Several neighboring property owners testified that they saw the
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fence over a long period of time going back to the 1940s. See Memorandum Decision at 4,
Finding of Fact No. 3. Lloyd Marchant saw the fence (see T. at 42); Reinhard Ruf saw the
fence (see T. at 54); Elden Stembridge saw the fence (see T. at 86); Orland Crandell saw the
fence (see T. at 70); and Brian Andersen saw the fence (see T. at 65). While the trial court
is apparently willing to make the ultimate inference that the Browns built the fence on the
side of a hill on Tracy's record property, not as a boundary, but to protect Tracy's record
property from Tracy's own livestock, yet it cannot make the inference that Tracy, who
occupied the land and ran the livestock, saw the fence that contained his livestock. If an
inference were to be made from the evidence, this is it: Tracy recognized and acquiesced in
the fence as the common boundary with Brown.
This court should make the inference that as an occupant running livestock on the
property, Tracy recognized the fence after its construction in the 1940fs for a period of more
than twenty years until the property was sold to Mr. Jorgensen in 1979. Thomas Brown
testified at trial that Tracy Wright never objected to the fence after its construction in the
1940fs. See T. at 109; see also Memorandum Decision at 5-6, Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and
9. Tracy's recognition of the fence and acquiescence in it as the boundary line from the mid1940's through 1979 constitutes boundary by acquiescence, even before Jorgensen took title
to the Jorgensen Parcel. "Once adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary for a
long period of time, the operation of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not vitiated
by a subsequent discovery of the true record boundary by one of the parties." RHN at f 31.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court was admittedly confused in its application of the applicable Utah law
in this boundary by acquiescence case, and the inferences made by the trial court reflect a
results-based decision that is not in harmony with Utah law. The trial court's evidentiary
findings support a judgment in Appellant Browns' favor. When the proper elements of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence are applied to the facts found by the trial court, the
inescapable conclusion is that the Browns are entitled to an adjudication in their favor. The
Appellants respectfully request that this Court apply the law to the facts as set forth above,
and award legal title to the Appellants over the subject property which the Appellants and
their predecessors have claimed and occupied for nearly sixty (60) years.

DATED this 28th day of October, 2005.

& HOGGAN, P.C.

James C. Jenkins
Robert B. Funk
Attorneys for Appellants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and
MARILYN R. BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 010600152

vs.
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10,
and other persons unknown claiming
title or interest in the suD]ect
property of this action,
Defendant.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: April 7, 2004

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C.
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martmeau and David
S. Cook.
BACKGROUND
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E.
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's piedecbssor's
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact
the recorded property line. It was not, and so the issue is
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert
K.
Hilder,
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs

on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of
law the boundary was established for a long period of time,
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the
court issued its ruling on^ September 22, 2003.
The court ruled
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs'
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial.
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence.
The court also refused to quiet title without trial.
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a
directed verdict under URCP, RuLe 50. The court believes that
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and
allowed defendant to present his evidence.
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.
LAW
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is
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the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the
court to be good and decent people.
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced
in.
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable
Robert K. Hilderr
has previously ruled that the final two
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden,
44 P. 3d 781 (Utah
2002);
Edgell
v. Canning,
976 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999);
Wilkinson
Family
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Farm v. Babcock,
993 P.2d 229
Ainsworth,
785 P. 2d 417 (Utah

(Utah App.
1990).

1999) ; Staker

v.

The court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40.
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road,
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as
well as the fence and ditch re Levant to this case.
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946,
though there is some testimony it was built before that.
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s.
4 . The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the ''subject
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979
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Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel
and the partnership dissolved in 198 6 and defendant acquired the
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986.
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the
area since the mid 1940s.
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs' family took
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built,
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971.
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell.
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments,
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his
property line.
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property,
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one,
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far
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south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the
road and then under the road.
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused
to remove the fence and filed this action to quiet title
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence.
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet
from the road as shown on exhibit 10.
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land.
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence.
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of
the land.
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always
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believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line.
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told
that.
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his
property, but ran it across the "road" or disputed approximate
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does
not call that area by the Bitch, the disputed area, a xxroad" but
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road.

ISSUES
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court.
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a

boundary.
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those
instruments showed that the true property line, according to
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the
fence line was the demarcation of the property line.
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land.
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property.
He had constructive knowledge since 197 9 when he obtained a deed
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property
line was according to the deeds and plats of record.
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the
property line.
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an
observable fence since that time.
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land,
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence.
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been
only up to that disputed fence.
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area.
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault
v.
Holden,
"where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to
recognize a marked line o r monument not on the true line as the
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover,
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line.
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence.
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault
v. Holden,
44 P. 3d at 13.
Defendant's actions in commissioning a
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence
line.
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line.
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to m effect
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or
boundary, without more, is not acquiescence. Though acquiescence
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by
plaintiff.
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner,
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a
boundary.
7. The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met.
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to a
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's
ownership.
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In
Wilkinson,
a Court of Appeals decision, the court said
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the
objective uncertainty element aad that has now been eliminated as
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson
in Ault that a landowner must
recognize and treat an observabLe line as the boundary,
''regardless of whether the^ landowner knows where the actual
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the
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objective uncertainty element.
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to
"appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs7
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a
property line.
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the
recorded instruments.
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.
DATED this

/

day

BRUCE C. LUBECK
\*°?S* *.-*.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^^2out$ ^
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BIT "A"
Said property being „..catcd in Section 15, Township.1 South, Ra
5. .E;i:
/ PARCEL 1: Lot 72, mure particuUrly described HH follows:,,
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3H97.490 feet and due Kast
J 9,393.776 feet from Che Northwest Corner of Section 10, Township
1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake rlasc £ Meridian, Summit County,
Utah.
(said Northwest Corner bearing North l ' O f W West from Southwest
Corner and being the basis of bearing for this description).
Thence:
Thence:
Thence:
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Thence:
Thencei

North 35 s 30 f West 1641.209 feet to .i point on the Southerly
iight-of-uay line of State Highway 196;
Xorth 43°42; Hast along said right -of-way line 1101.410 feet
to a point of tendency with a 1095.916 foot radius curve;
Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through
a central angle of 40°55,3r'. » distance of 837.778 feet to a
point on the West line of the Southeast 1/u. of Northeastl/4 of
Section 15, Township 1 South, Eaneo 5 F.ast, Salt Lake Sasc &
Meridian;
leaving said r*.-,ht-of-uay lines 2° 28'3 3" East along said West
line to the Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter of said Section 13;
Hast along ihe South line of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of ?*-*U Section 13 t o the Northeast Corner of the
Southeast 1/4 of said Section J 5;
South 2°30T40" East along the East line of said Southeast 1/4
1297.974 feet;
South 80° West 1922.645 feel, to the point of i'.EGI NNINC.
Access from State Highway 19f'.

EXCKl'TINC therefrom the following described parcels:

/

iiK^l.NNl NC at the Northeast Corner of the" Southeast Quarter of Section 15,
Tov:i.M;ip 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Ma*;*- f, Meridian, running thence
West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly 703 feet, more or less, to a point on
•the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning; thence North
671 feet to the place of BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING therefrom that portion of the io1]owi m; described parcel lying
within so id tract.
A tract situated in the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section
15,.Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Sale Like Base & -Meridian, described cs
follows:
BECIN.\" INC at the Northeast Comer of r he Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter of said Section 15, arid running thence South 11.00 chains:
thence North 4? D 20 r West 16.5 chains; thence East 12.42 chains to the place
of BEGINNING.

/'PARCEL 2:
BEGINNING :j L ..he Southeast Corner v\' Section 15, Township 1
South, Range 5 East, >„it Luke Base & Meridian, and running thence North
:«lonj- the East line of said Section 15t to a point which Is South
2°j0,L0'f
East along the East line of said Section 13, 1297.974 feet from th- Northeast Corner of the Southeast Quarter of said Section 13, and running thence
South 86° West 1922.645 feet' thence South 3/.°12'38M Vest 1701.301 feet;
thence North 85°55'57" West 1127.841 feet; thence South 5°05'32" West 292.641
feet, ::iore or less, to the South line of said Section 13; thence East along
the South lino of said Section
13, 4,507.791 feet :o the point of BEGINNING.
PARCEL 3: BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East Quarter Section Corner of said
Section 15; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5 chains; thence South 58°
10 f East 13.02 chains, moire or less, to the place of BEGINNING.
ALL PARCELS LIMITED TO SURFACE RIGHTS ONLY.
^
aiyers subject to the right of Sunlit County zo reassess the tax assessment on said
<f• loperty-in accordance with Sees, 59-5-o6 103 VCA i953 as disclosed by certain Annuel
^Q
••'plication for Assessment and Taxation c( Agricultural Land 1969.
UJ^gy

is s
Stibject to the Covenants and Conditions as set forth in that certain WaLranty
Deed dated April 3rd, 1978, by and between TRACY LAND AND LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
Grantor, and UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, TRUSTEE, Grantee, recorded
April 5th, 1979, in Rook M 130, at Pages 682-685, as Entry No. 154706, of
Official Records of Summit County, Utah, and recorded April 6th, 1979, in
Book .124, at Pages 589-592, as Er.c .y No.' 116016, of Official Records of
Wasatch Com
, Utah.
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